This paper evaluates the role of the first arrow of Abenomics in guiding public perceptions on monetary policy stance through the management of expectations. In order to end chronic deflation, a policy regime change must be perceived by economic agents. Analysis using the QUICK survey system (QSS) monthly survey data shows that the reaction of monetary policy to inflation has been declining since the mid 2000s, implying intensified forward guidance well before Abenomics. However, Japan seems to have moved closer to a long-term liquidity trap, where even long-term bond yields are constrained by the zero lower bound. Estimated changes in perceptions are not abrupt enough to satisfy Sargent's (1982) 
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interest rates due to quantitative easing can be attributed to expectations of low future short-term interest rates." 3 In this vein, an increase in base money as examined by the QQME may imply strong commitment in terms of policy duration and possibly, at the same time, further monetary easing in the future.
Indeed, the minutes of the Monetary Policy Meeting more than a decade ago, of March 19, 2001 , report that " [o] ne member proposed that in the current environment where reducing interest rates would have only a limited effect on the economy, the Bank should consider increasing the amount of government bonds it bought outright, in order to affect the public's expectations and underline the Bank's commitment to the targeted interest rate in terms of duration."
So, the success of new measures in monetary policy after Abenomics hinges on whether it can induce an abrupt change, a regime shift, or an upheaval in agents' perceptions of monetary policy stance toward a stronger forward guidance. Kuroda (2013a) indeed states that the QQME is intended "to drastically change the expectations of markets and economic entities." Sargent (1982) argues that " [t] here must be an abrupt change in the continuing government policy, or strategy, for setting deficits now and in the future that is sufficiently binding to be believed." Eggertsson (2008) calls this "Sargent's (1982) criteria for regime change." As analyzed in Eggertsson (2008) , regime shift must be observed as changes between policy rules.
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A regime change is also called for, in order to exit from deflationary expectation as in Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2002). 5 Inflation expectation may have been 3 See, for example, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011), or Bauer and Rudebusch (2013) . 4 In Eggertsson (2008) , the difference between the Hoover and the Roosevelt regimes is found in the welfare maximization problem by the social planner. The latter is not subject to the fiscal dogma. Thus, the solutions, namely the optimal policy rules, are inevitably different between these two regimes. 5 Another possible criterion for a regime change is the Taylor principle. Clarida, Gali, and Gertler Once the economy gets stuck there, a superinertial monetary policy rule or the price level targeting can eliminate the deflationary trap, as investigated by Sugo and Ueda (2008b) . Thus, if the deflation continues as a result of the economy being stuck at the deflationary steady state, policy regime shift is the only theoretical way to exit from deflationary expectation.
Modern macroeconomics emphasizes the importance of the management of expectation in public policy. Expectation is, however, not the control variable but a mere consequence of policy actions. 6 Even when a public authority initiates an abrupt policy change, a clear and stable structural relationship between controllable tools implemented by public policy and expectation must exist for the policy to be effective. If such a relationship does not exist, policy cannot be credible and expectation may become uncontrollable.
In this paper, we empirically evaluate changes in monetary policy stance to examine if there has been a monetary policy regime shift in Japan. 7 In order to determine whether satisfied in the case of Japan's monetary policy, but this lies beyond the scope of this paper. Obtaining a precise estimate of monetary policy stance is difficult due to endogeneity and the zero lower bound.
Therefore, examining if there is any monetary policy regime change is the sole aim of this paper. 6 Hausman and Wieland (2014) give an overview of economic and financial developments before and after Abenomics. They, however, admit that they lack the theoretical explanation of the management of expectation, writing "[a]n important caveat is that we treat Abenomics as is. That is, we take as given the effect of Abe's policies on expected inflation and expected future output." Romer (2013) claims that "[t]he regime shift we are seeing in Japan is just the kind of bold action that might actually succeed in changing both inflation and growth expectations a substantial amount.
As a result, it may be an effective tool for encouraging robust recovery and an end to deflation." Yet, the theoretical channel as to which the regime shift is brought about is not explained. Indeed, it is written that "[m]y support for that conclusion is based less on theory and more on economic history. to be close to a long-term liquidity trap, where not only short-term but also long-term bond yields are constrained by the zero lower bound. Consequently, we cannot find any significant evidence that the first arrow of Abenomics, in particular, the QQME has abruptly changed perceptions on how monetary policy will be conducted in the future.
In summary, the QSS data on inflation and interest-rate expectations reveal no significant regime shift in monetary policy after the introduction of Abenomics or the QQME.
Under the long-term liquidity trap, the forward guidance policy hinders its effectiveness.
How could then a central bank design effective policy tools to exit from such a trap?
The structure of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 illustrates how macroeconomic variables responded to Abenomics. Section 3 first discusses the details of the QSS data and then investigates changes in perceptions about the monetary policy stance.
Section 4 summarizes findings in this paper and concludes. These developments in financial as well as real economic variables seem to suggest the success of Abenomics. Such a casual evaluation, however, needs some reservations.
Abenomics and Macroeconomy
Reflecting on the consecutive trade surpluses, Japan has the largest net foreign assets.
Thus, the Japanese yen is said to be a safe haven currency. As a result, yen tends to appreciate when international financial markets are at risk-off, or when the VIX is high. 10 Mr. Abe became prime minister in December 2012. We, however, chose November 2012 as the month when Abenomics was introduced. Our reason for this is that his election victory was widely predicted when the lower house was dissolved in November 2012.
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QSS
This paper exploits the QSS (QUICK survey system) data provided by the QUICK corporation. The QSS is a survey of forecasts on financial as well as macro economic variables. 
Bond-yields Expectations
JGB yields at all maturities declined throughout the sample. These hint at either increasing perceptions toward future accommodative monetary policy or decreasing natural interest rates. Importantly, these are not the result of something specific in the period 9 after the introduction of Abenomics. Skewness has not been significantly different from zero. Respondents throughout this sample were not very concerned about the default risk of JGBs. Figure 3 shows times-series bond yields for mean as well as 2.5, 10, 50
(median), 90, and 97.5 percentile points. As consistent with the actual movements in Figure 2 , expectations for 5-, 10-and 20-year interest rates jumped up to the level of mid 2012, despite the QQME in April 2013. At the same time, cross-sectional variations in the market participants' forecasts for bond yields became larger. Albeit temporarily, the QQME increased market uncertainty.
Inflation Expectations
The contribution of consumption tax is implicitly included in the QSS in inflation expectations. 11 In August 2012, the upper-house parliament passed a tax bill to raise the consumption-tax rate from 5% to 8% in April 2014 and then to 10% in September 2015. Short-term inflation expectations increased in sample (D). Those for the next 1 and 2 years rose by 0.4% and 0.5%, respectively. This may reflect the intended effect of the first arrow, but may also simply reflect contributions from an expected increase in the consumption tax rate as illustrated in Figure 4 . Also, long-term inflation expectations are stable at around 1% throughout the sample. They are well below the new inflation target of 2% adopted in January 2013.
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11 From September 2013, the QSS explicitly asks the respondents to include contributions from consumption tax in their forecasts. 12 Not all goods are subject to consumption tax. 13 As Kuroda (2013b) states in December, inflation expectations are formed not only by a forwardlooking element but also by an adaptive or backward-looking element. Such a view was, however, not expressed at the introduction of the QQME.
The last finding is reinforced by Figure 5 , which demonstrates that the median of inflation expectations for the next 10 years has hardly increased. It remains at 1% from 2011 onwards. Compared with the sharp rise in inflation expectations for the 2.5 percentile highest point, the remaining percentiles show much smaller increases. They are below 2%, the new inflation target level. According to Table 1 , skewness is positive.
These results altogether suggest that an increase in the mean of inflation expectations was driven by the upper tail of the distribution. Even though the inflation target was raised from 1% to 2% and the QQME has been introduced, there is no significant increase in median of long-term inflation expectations.
14 No upheaval in inflation expectations is yet observed.
To compare inflation expectations from other sources, Table 1 includes professional forecasts as well as households' inflation expectations. 15 While the average of households' inflation expectations is biased upward against the other two surveys, the differences of average inflation expectations over 1-year between the QSS and the ESP are small. As shown in Figure 6 , developments in inflation expectations over the 1 year horizon are similar of the three types. Moreover, market expectations measured by the inflation indexed bonds exhibit a similar level of long-term inflation expectations to the QSS (Bank of Japan, 2014).
Evaluating Monetary Policy Stance
Using the QSS data, we look at market perceptions on monetary policy stance. The QSS contains individual forecasts on both interest and inflation rates. By using such cross-sectional information, monetary policy stance or the policy reaction function can be estimated even with a short sample.
A monetary policy reaction is assumed to be
where i S t and π t denote short-term policy interest and inflation rates, respectively. Both are expressed in annualized rates. Time aggregation leads to
where i L t+k and π L t+k denote long-term bond yields and average inflation expectations over the next k periods, respectively. E t,j is an investor j's expectation operator given information available at t.
Even though the zero lower bound constrains a short-term interest rate, a main transmission channel still works through forward guidance about future interest rates.
That said, monetary policy reaction may not be stable throughout sample periods. Our aim is to examine the (in)stability of the monetary policy reaction by estimating the relationship in equation (1), which is based on the Taylor type rule. If there is regime change, for example, associated with a shift of operational instrument from interest rates to monetary base, then observed monetary policy reaction, or an observed relationship between interest rates and inflation rates, as in equation (1), will change. We investigate such a possibility by dividing sample periods.
An estimation of the expected policy reaction follows the spirit of Kim and Pruitt (2013) . 16 They aim to estimate the policy reaction function under the zero lower bound.
The censoring problem due to the zero lower bound is cleared by using the survey forecasts for the period when policy interest rates are positive. In our paper, use of the forecasts on the long-term bond yields and long-term inflation expectations allows us to evaluate the monetary policy stance perceived by market participants. Even though the long-term bond yields are very low, they are positive and show some dynamics depending on macroeconomic environments. We can still observe the time-variations in the monetary policy stance perceived by the market participants.
To be precise, we estimate four variants of equation (1):
where c j represents a fixed effect for investors. Variables with subscripts t
for expectations over 2 years, at (0, 120) for those over 10 years, and at (24, 120) for those from 2 to 10 years. For example, when (k, k ′ ) is (24, 120), the variable indicates expectations of bond-yields or inflation over 10 years subtracted by those over 2 years.
The last specification alleviates the estimation problem due to the zero lower bound most effectively, because it does not use short-term interest rates that are severely constrained by the zero lower bound. 17 The subscript of the interest rate starts with t + 3, because 3-month ahead expectations are used following the questionnaire of the QSS. In (III) and (IV), i L t→t+k indicates actual long-term bond yields for the maturity of k. We estimate these four equations for four subsamples (A) to (D) in Table 1 .
Both α and ρ contain information about monetary policy stance. Parameter α should exceed unity to satisfy the Taylor principle, but can be below unity if monetary policy commits to keeping low interest rates or term premium is time-varying. 18 In equations 17 The censoring problem is not entirely resolved, because a current short-term interest rate is constrained at zero and future short-term interest rates are also constrained with a positive probability.
See Appendix for the possible effects from this censoring problem on our estimates. 18 Contrary to inflation expecatations, forecasts on bond yields are about the market rate. Therefore,
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(III) and (IV), when ρ is included and less than one, the long run coefficient corresponds to α/(1 − ρ). Thus, this value should exceed unity. If ρ is one or above, α should be positive to satisfy the Taylor principle. As will be shown theoretically in Appendix, a small α implies that a central bank will not react strongly to a rise in inflation expectations, Estimates of α and ρ are subject to two identification challenges, as Section 4.2 and Appendix discuss. We do not, thus, claim that our estimates are precise. However, this
is not a critical point influencing the main aim of this paper. Rather, we are interested in whether there is any regime change in monetary policy or significant enhancement of the forward guidance, that is, we are interested in the dynamic properties of these parameters rather than their sizes. Tables 2, 3 , and 4 demonstrate that monetary policy reaction, captured by the coefficient of the interest rate on the inflation rate, α, is overall positive and smaller than unity. Also, it exhibits a declining trend. In particular, α becomes insignificant in some specifications in the subsample (C) and (D). The difference in α before and after the introduction of Abenomics, namely, between subsamples (C) and (D), is the smallest among others. α declines significantly from subsample (C) to (D) in only 3 out of 12 regressions. 
Estimation Results
Identification Issue
The aim of this paper is to examine if there is any monetary policy regime change or any significant change in the degree of the forward guidance, not to obtain precise estimates on monetary policy stance. Nevertheless, it is important to discuss identification issues regarding endogeneity and a zero lower bound. In what follows, the endogeneity problem is discussed using the standard new Keynesian model.
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Estimating equation (1) with expectations is subject to endogeneity. This is because expectations on both interest and inflation rates are endogenous variables. Let us examine here under which circumstances estimation results as above replicate the coefficients in policy reactions using a simple general equilibrium model.
According to the simple New Keynesian model, the economy is expressed by three equations: the Taylor rule, the Phillips curve, and the IS (Euler) curve:
whereî t ,π t , andx t indicate log-linearized deviations of the short-term nominal interest rate, the inflation rate, and the output gap at t, respectively. Parameters α, β, and σ represent the coefficient of the Taylor rule on the inflation rate, a discount factor, and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, respectively. Exogenous shocks are described by a monetary policy shock u t , a markup shock z t , and a real interest rate shock v t .
To enable analytical investigations, we assume that exogenous shocks hit the economy only at t = 1 and 2. The economy returns to its steady state at t = 3, that is, u t = z t = v t = 0 for t ≥ 3. We can obtain a rational expectation equilibrium as follows:
23 In order to understand the possible estimation bias from monetary policy shock visually, simulation results using the new Keynesian model are presented in Appendix. The identification issue regarding a zero lower bound is also examined in Appendix.
Corresponding dependent and explanatory variables in the variants of equation (1) are the long-term interest rate (î 1 + E 1î2 )/2 and the long-term inflation expectation (π 1 + E 1π2 )/2, respectively. It is immediately clear that as long as the monetary policy shocks u 1 and u 2 are zero, the estimate of α equals the true coefficient of the Taylor rule.
So, the validity of the interpretation based on the estimation of equation (1) depends on whether or not the contribution of monetary policy shocks to the economy is small.
In this regard, Sugo and Ueda (2008a) estimate a medium-scale DSGE model for Japan and report that the majority of short-term fluctuations in the inflation rate are driven by markup and technology shocks. 24 Also, the fact that α is basically positive implies that our interpretation has a small margin of inaccuracy. This is because when only monetary policy shocks are present, the estimate of α becomes negative.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have evaluated monetary policy stance using the panel survey forecasts of the QSS. Long-term inflation expectations have not risen significantly. Since the mid 2000s, the central bank has intensified its commitment to maintaining low interest rates in the future. No abrupt regime change has been observed before or after the introduction of Abenomics.
Admittedly, this paper has been silent on why financial markets improved during the implementation of the policies termed Abenomics. The scope of this paper was limited to the market perceptions of the monetary policy stance among QSS respondents. Thus, we cannot deny the possibility that the first arrow of the Abenomics could work via other channels, that are not through inflation and policy rate expectations. 25 Although it may not be easy to explain such a channel with existing theory, let us here discuss three possibilities.
The first possibility is that Abenomics influenced market perceptions outside QSS 24 Naturally, in the long-term, one type of monetary policy shock, an inflation target shock, influences inflation rates dominantly. 25 There may exist the (expectations of) Olympic effects. Rose and Spiegel (2011) show that hosting Olympic has positive impacts on exports.
respondents, that is, outside Japan. In that regard, Fukuda (2014) complements our study and examines asymmetric market reactions to Abenomics using intra-day price developments. He convincingly illustrates that foreign investors were far more aggressive purchasers of Japanese stocks and US dollars against Japanese yen than local investors.
Yet, we still need a theory why and how such actions by foreign investors were induced.
Second, quantitative easing, as one kind of monetary policy, may have some impact on real economic variables through its effects on asset prices via a portfolio balance effect coined by Tobin (1958) such an effect to other financial variables than long-term bonds, Orphanides and Wieland (2000) state that "the quantitative magnitude of any such effect may be very small and is certainly highly uncertain." Thus, it is still uncertain whether such a portfolio balance channel could reverse deflationary expectation.
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The third channel is through fiscal policy, or more broadly, strategic interaction between the central bank and the government. Indeed, Eggertsson (2008) points out that 26 Woodford (2012) states that " [u] nfortunately, neither of the theories typically relied upon to explain why that should be the case -the quantity-theoretic doctrine that expansion of the monetary base must inevitably lead to increased aggregate nominal spending, or the particular kind of preferred-habitat model of the term structure that would imply the existence of a "duration-risk channel" -has a robust theoretical basis (in the sense of following from hypotheses that seem likely to be true, rather than relying upon special assumptions that might nonetheless conceivably be true) or finds much support from experience thus far."
fiscal regime change stopped chronic deflation in the United States. Sargent (1981 Sargent ( , 1982 illustrates the important roles of governments in stopping or not stopping inflation. According to the fiscal theory of price level, fiscal theory dominantly determines a general price level (Leeper, 1991; Woodford, 1995 it is fair to point out that the size of regression residuals reported in Tables 2 and 3 decreases, rather than increases, from subsample (A) to (D). The bottom two panels in Figure A .1 indicate a change in estimated α when short-term interest and inflation rates are used for estimation. Basically, the bias stemming from endogeneity is the same.
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A.2 Zero Lower Bound
Another important challenge in evaluating monetary policy stance stems from the zero lower bound of nominal interest rates. Explicit consideration of the zero lower bound transforms the previous three equations intô ı t = max(0, r + απ t + u t ). 27 We also confirm that, as long as the monetary policy shock is not comparatively large, ρ is correctly estimated. A relative increase in the shock lowers the estimate of ρ to zero.
andx
To have a positive interest rate off the zero lower bound, we introduce r > 0 as a steady-state rate of real interest. We assume discretionary policy for t ≥ 3. This makes π t = x t = 0 and i t = r for t ≥ 3 after exogenous shocks disappear. We also assume that a negative shock of v 1 is sufficiently large to bring the nominal interest rateî 1 to the zero lower bound.
Backward induction yields the following rational expectation equilibrium. For t = 2, 
